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NOTE 
 
THIS LITTLE PIGGY CAUSED A NUISANCE:  
ANALYZING NORTH CAROLINA’S 2018 AMENDMENT TO ITS 
RIGHT-TO-FARM ACT 
 
Ashley Pollard† 
 
“Also if a person keeps his hogs, or other noisome animals, so near the house 
of another that the stench of them incommodes him and makes the air 
unwholesome, this is an injurious nuisance, as it tends to deprive him of the 
use and benefit of his house.”1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Hogs stink. It’s as simple as that. Because of this fact, North Carolina, along 
with many other states, adopted a “right-to-farm” statute in the late 1970s. 
These statutes were designed to protect farmers from being held liable for the 
nuisances that their farms created. The need for the statutes was felt deeply in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s as the suburbs began a hostile takeover of former 
agricultural lands. The purpose of the laws was to prevent the farmers’ new 
neighbors from suing them for the stench, or other nuisances, caused by their 
farms.  
In the summer of 2018, the North Carolina General Assembly passed an 
amendment to the North Carolina Right-to-farm Statute. This amendment 
substantially limited the circumstances under which a neighbor to a farm could 
bring a nuisance action against a farming operation. This amendment came 
during a summer of nuisance victories for hog farm neighbors. The legislature 
considered these actions “frivolous” and began its work to amend the statute to 
prevent similar actions from succeeding.2  
 
†   Submissions Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Vol. 14; B.A., 2017, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. Candidate, 2020, Liberty University School of Law. I would 
like to thank my parents, David and Donna Pollard, for their constant love and support 
throughout my life. I would not be where I am today without them. I would also like to thank 
William Hurley for his support and encouragement throughout the writing process.   
1.   3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217. 
2.   S.B. 711, N.C. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2018). 
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While the legislature had the best of intentions in attempting to further 
shield farmers from nuisance liability, it missed the point being made in the 
actions: factory-sized farms are damaging to property rights and human 
health. It is this reasoning that the neighbors adopted in their arguments, and 
it is this reasoning that has now won over several juries.  
 Because of the negative impact on both property rights and human health, 
North Carolina lawmakers should revise the current statute to accommodate 
the industry’s shift to factory-sized farming operations. Additionally, the North 
Carolina courts should implement the use of pretrial hearings to determine 
whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to certain plaintiffs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after Tom Butler began raising pigs at his Lillington, North 
Carolina, farm, he received an upsetting call from his neighbor down the 
road.3 This call brought the news that Butler’s neighbor, who lived two miles 
from his farm, could smell his hogs in her home.4 This revelation greatly 
troubled Butler and created a desire within him to change.5 “We don’t have 
the right to make anyone suffer while we profit,” said Butler; “[i]f we can do 
something to lessen the impact on our neighbors, then we should be doing 
something.”6 And something is exactly what he did.  
Since receiving this phone call, Butler has taken great steps in reducing the 
impact, i.e., the smell, of his farm on his surrounding community.7 In 
furtherance of this goal, Butler installed green tarps, made of a high-density 
plastic, over his waste lagoons.8 These tarps began working immediately to 
decrease the smell, but they also kept out rainwater to prevent spillage and 
trapped the methane gas which emits from the waste as it decays.9 Through 
the use of technology, which he has spent the past eight years researching and 
developing, Butler is able to recycle the methane gas from his hogs’ waste to 
provide energy for his farm and “up to 150 homes in Harnett County.”10 
 
3.   Billy Liggett, Power of Rural, CAMPBELL MAG., June 12, 2018, at 25.  
4.   Id.  
5.   Id.  
6.   Id. at 26.  
7.   Id.  
8.   Id.  
9.   Liggett, supra note 3, at 26.  
10.   Id. at 26–27.  
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However, not all hog farmers adhere to Butler’s philosophy of lessening 
the impact of his farm on his neighbors. These farmers adopt a farming 
method by which they prevent the overflow of their waste lagoons by 
spraying the waste as fertilizer on nearby fields.11 While this technique is 
common, it has acute ramifications on public health.12 A 2016 report from 
Duke University Medical Center found that “living near concentrated animal 
feeding operations causes upper-respiratory problems, high blood pressure, 
fatigue, depression and exposure to a number of carcinogens.”13 Despite the 
negative impact that industrialized hog farms have on the community, 
lawmakers continue to shield them from nuisance liability through right-to-
farm acts. These statutes have not only failed to change with the increase of 
factory-style farming operations but have also narrowed the circumstances 
in which neighbors may hold farmers accountable for the nuisances that they 
create.14  
Allowing the right-to-farm to extend to concentrated animal feeding 
operations will pose issues involving the property rights and the health of 
farm neighbors. For these reasons, courts should institute a balancing test 
through which they balance the interests of the property owners against the 
legislative purpose of applying statutory immunity to farmers. Through this 
balancing test, courts could achieve justice by finding the statute 
unconstitutional as applied to certain plaintiffs.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Home to nearly 9 million hogs, the Tar Heel State is hog heaven, or 
perhaps hog hell.15 North Carolina is the nation’s second largest hog-
producer, trailing behind Iowa’s 22.6 million pigs.16 However, with many 
hogs come many problems. Other than angry phone calls from neighbors, 
the main issue that hog growers face is their potential nuisance liability.  
 
 
11.   Hog Farms & Hurricanes: A Primer on Lagoons and Flooding, N.C. PORK COUNCIL (Sept. 
11, 2018), http://www.ncpork.org/primer/. 
12.   See infra note 34. 
13.   Liggett, supra note 3, at 28.  
14.   Cordon M. Smart, The “Right to Commit Nuisance” in North Carolina: A Historical 
Analysis of the Right-to-Farm Act, 94 N.C. L. REV. 2097, 2116 (2016). 
15.   Liggett, supra note 3, at 30. 
16.   Id.  
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A. What Is a Nuisance? 
Before one can understand the “right-to-farm,” it is important to note 
what that “right” protects farmers from, namely, private nuisance liability.17 
Generally, a nuisance is the unreasonable interference with another’s use and 
enjoyment of her land.18 Nuisance law is a court-developed doctrine that is 
imbedded in the principle “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,” which means 
“one must so use her property as not to injure that of another.”19 Essentially, 
“[t]he law of nuisance provides that although each landowner has the general 
right to make use of her land as she wishes, no landowner has the right to use 
her land in a way that unreasonably interferes with her neighbors’ enjoyment 
of their possessory rights in their land.”20 
B. Hog Farming in North Carolina: From Small Farms to CAFOs 
In the dawn of the twentieth century, the agricultural industry employed 
nearly half of the United States’ population.21 In addition to its employment 
of a high percentage of the American workforce, the agricultural industry 
supplied Americans with food. These two aspects of the industry proved 
extremely important to America as a whole, and with the rise of suburban 
America on the horizon, lawmakers saw fit to protect America’s farmers from 
potential nuisance liability resulting from the encroaching urbanization.22 
This protection came in the form of statutes known as “right-to-farm acts.”  
Right-to-farm acts offer statutory immunity to farms from civil liability 
arising from nuisance lawsuits. In the 1970s, former agricultural lands 
became fraught with an influx of citizens, giving farmers neighbors that they 
did not once have.23 The influx of people brought an influx of complaints 
about the smells and noises coming from neighboring farms. These 
complaints took the form of nuisance lawsuits, and farmers became liable for 
the disturbance their operations caused their new neighbors. In the interest 
of justice, our nation’s lawmakers took to drafting legislation to protect 
 
17.   See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020).  
18.   R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, ET AL., Governmental Land Use Controls: Judicial Doctrines 
and Legislative Regulation, in PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 822–24 (3d. ed. 2011).  
19.   Id. at 823.  
20.   Id. 
21.   DIMITRI ET AL., ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., ECON. INFO. BULL. NO. 3, THE 
20TH CENTURY TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY, 2 (June 2005). 
22.   See Smart, supra note 14, at 2116. 
23.   Id. 
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farmers from the increased urbanization which threatened to run them out 
of business. As a result, the right-to-farm was born.  
Since the 1970s, every state has enacted a right-to-farm act, each with 
varying degrees of protection.24 The typical right-to-farm offers nuisance 
immunity to farms that comply with state regulations. In recognition of the 
right-to-farm’s history, the majority of states have limited nuisance 
immunity to only allow immunity against neighbors that “came to the 
nuisance.”25 This “coming to the nuisance” defense allows farmers the ability 
to protect themselves from neighbors who moved into the agricultural lands 
after the farm had occupied the land for a specified period of time.26  
In recent years, America’s agricultural industry has experienced a shift 
from traditional, small family farms to large-scale farms with corporate 
contracts.27 North Carolina has not been exempted from this trend. In the 
past few decades, North Carolina’s farm industry has seen a massive shift 
toward large-scale farming and a decrease in the traditional family farm.28 
Change in the industry, however, has not spurred change in policy. With the 
decreasing number of family farms and the increasing number of “factory 
farms,” states continue to protect farms from nuisance liability through right-
to-farm acts, and industrial-sized farms, known popularly as CAFOs, hide 
behind such protection.  
1. What Is a CAFO? 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”), popularly known 
as “factory farms,” are particular types of Animal Feeding Operations 
(“AFOs”) which meet certain regulatory criteria.29 To be considered a CAFO, 
a farm must first be defined as an AFO.30 An AFO, as defined within the 
Clean Water Act, is an agricultural operation which keeps and raises animals 
 
24.   CARRIE HRIBAR, UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND 
THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 11, (Nat’l Ass’n of Loc. Boards of Health, 2010). 
25.   Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-To-
Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 88 (2006).  
26.   See Smart, supra note 14, at 2117. 
27.   See ECON. RES. SERV., supra note 21 (charting the declining percentage of the labor force 
employed in agriculture).  
28.   See Smart, supra note 14, at 2104. 
29.   See Hribar, supra note 24, at 1. 
30.   Id.  
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   133 5/14/20   9:43 AM
574 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2 
 
in a confined situation.31 An AFO is a lot or facility where animals are stabled 
or confined for forty-five days or more in a twelve-month period.32 A CAFO 
is an “AFO with more than 1000 animal units . . . confined on site for more 
than 45 days during the year.”33 
CAFOs have economic benefits such as providing low cost meat and 
promoting the local economy.34 However, these benefits come with costs: the 
impact on public health through contamination of the air and water, horrible 
odors, creation of insect vectors, exposure to pathogens, and the lowering of 
property values in the surrounding area.35 
2. The Health Issues Arising from Current CAFO Farming 
Methods 
One of the major concerns about CAFOs is their impact on public health. 
Farms and other agricultural operations are heavily regulated to mitigate the 
damage to their surrounding environments. The Clean Water Act, for 
example, places limits on a farm’s operations to ensure that it does not badly 
pollute the groundwater and surrounding waterways.36 Pollution is especially 
vexing in areas where most residents obtain their drinking water from private 
wells, which can be contaminated and cause its drinkers to experience 
diarrhea, vomiting, and nausea.37 The concern over water pollution is 
magnified in eastern North Carolina, the home of many hog farms. The 
magnification of pollution concerns is attributable to a method of waste 
management adopted by hog farmers, the anaerobic lagoon system.  
 
31.   Id.  
32.   Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/animal-feeding-operations-afos (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).  
33.   Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/plantsanimals/livestock/afo/ (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
34.   See Hribar, supra note 24, at 2.  
35.   Id. at 2–11. 
36.   See generally 33 U.S.C.A. § 1329 (2020).  
37.   Wynne Davis, Overflowing Hog Lagoons Raise Environmental Concerns in North 
Carolina, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/22/650698240/hu
rricane-s-aftermath-floods-hog-lagoons-in-north-carolina.  
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Anaerobic lagoons are deep, man-made ponds which store excrement.38 
These lagoons are often not lined, but rather are open-air, earthen basins.39 
The typical depth of an anaerobic lagoon is eight feet or greater.40 The waste 
enters through the bottom of the lagoon and mixes with the “sludge” layer.41 
The lagoons are often a pink, Pepto-Bismol tint resulting from the bacteria 
in the mixture.42 After a specified period of time, which varies from lagoon to 
lagoon, the now-liquid waste is applied as a fertilizer on nearby fields through 
the use of sprayers.43  
While the obvious issue these lagoons raise would be the potential for 
water pollution, the Act has graciously provided that it shall not affect or 
defeat the right of potential plaintiffs to recover for injuries or damages 
resulting from water pollution.44 This provision, however, does not preserve 
claims for injuries or damages resulting from air pollution or illness caused 
by airborne bacteria emanating from the lagoons. As noted in the previous 
section, researchers have attributed a variety of illnesses and even higher 
mortality rates to living in close proximity to hog farm operations.45  
While these health issues could be resolved through enacting more 
restrictive regulations on the farms, an alternative to enacting further 
legislation would be to permit nuisance lawsuits under certain circumstances. 
This alternative is useful because statutory enforcement actions are often 
 
38.   U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WASTEWATER TECHNOLOGY FACT SHEET: ANAEROBIC 
LAGOONS (Sept. 2002).  
39.   Id.; see Emily Moon, North Carolina’s Hog Waste Problem Has A Long History. Why 
Wasn’t It Solved In Time For Hurricane Florence?, PACIFIC STANDARD (Sept. 14, 2018) 
https://psmag.com/environment/why-wasnt-north-carolinas-hog-waste-problem-solved-
before-hurricane-florence) (explaining some newer pits are now lined with clay). 
40.   U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WASTEWATER TECHNOLOGY FACT SHEET: ANAEROBIC 
LAGOONS (Sept. 2002). 
41.   Id.  
42.   Wynne Davis, Overflowing Hog Lagoons Raise Environmental Concerns in North 
Carolina, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 22, 2018, 07:54 p.m.), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/22/65
0698240/hurricane-s-aftermath-floods-hog-lagoons-in-north-carolina.  
43.   Hog Farms & Hurricanes: A Primer on Lagoons and Flooding, N.C. PORK COUNCIL (Sept. 
11, 2018), http://www.ncpork.org/primer/. 
44.   N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(c) (2020).  
45.   Julia Kravchenko et. al., Mortality and Health Outcomes in North Carolina 
Communities Located in Close Proximity to Hog Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 79 
N.C. MED. J., NO. 5, 278 (2018).  
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difficult and expensive.46 Additionally, successful enforcement actions will 
not provide plaintiffs with the proper remedies and compensation for their 
injuries and damages.47 
C. The Cases Against Murphy-Brown, LLC  
In 2013, 479 plaintiffs filed twenty-five cases in the Superior Court of 
Wake County, North Carolina against Smithfield Foods, Inc., Murphy-
Brown, LLC, and several individual growers in eastern North Carolina.48 
These suits alleged nuisance and negligence claims against approximately 
ninety hog farms.49 In August 2014, 515 plaintiffs filed approximately twenty-
five cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina; these claims were filed exclusively against Murphy-Brown.50 
The plaintiffs in the first decided case, McKiver v. Murphy Brown, LLC, 
consisted of ten neighbors who lived near a hog farm that housed nearly 
15,000 hogs.51 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged several injuries to the 
use and enjoyment of their property, such as the heavy stench that was 
impossible to remove from their clothing, the swarms of flies that terrorized 
their yards, and the increased noise from the farm’s trucks.52 During trial, the 
plaintiffs focused on the anaerobic lagoons53 used by the farms to store hog 
waste until the waste could be liquefied and sprayed onto nearby fields.54  
 
46.   Andrew C. Hanson, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and the Common Law: 
Fixing Wrongs Committed Under the Right-to-farm, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES 
FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 287 (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini eds., 2007). 
47.   Id. 
48.   Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 
2014 WL 12837397 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 7:14-cv-00180-BR). 
49.   Id.  
50.   Id.  
51.   Anne Blythe, Jury Awards Hog Farm Neighbors $50 Million, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Apr. 26, 2018, 07:25 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article209927914.
html; see also Ned Barnett, Opinion, N.C. Hog Industry Gets a Whiff of Odor’s Cost – $50 
million. Will It Clean Up Now?, NEWS & OBSERVER (May 1, 2018, 03:57 PM), 
https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article210207404.html. 
52.   Anne Blythe, Jury Awards Hog Farm Neighbors $50 Million, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Apr. 26, 2018, 07:25 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article209927914.
html. 
53.   Id. 
54.   Id. 
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In reinforcing their nuisance argument, the plaintiffs acquired several 
experts to establish the farms’ interference with their quality of life. These 
experts specialized in research on CAFOs and their impact on public health.55  
In addition to providing testimony from public health professionals, 
plaintiffs from each lawsuit underwent testing of their homes for a bacterium 
called Pig2Bac, a microbe native to swine that is excreted with hog feces.56 
The testing and report was done by Dr. Shane Rogers, a professor at 
Clarkston University who previously worked alongside the Environmental 
Protection Agency.57 Of the seventeen homes tested, fourteen tested positive 
for the bacterium.58 In his report on this study, Dr. Rogers stated that “[i]t is 
far more likely than not that hog feces also gets inside the clients[’] homes 
where they live and where they eat.”59  
In April 2018, the first verdict in this series of lawsuits was rendered.60 The 
jury awarded the plaintiffs $50 million, a mixture of both compensatory and 
punitive damages.61 However, in order to comply with the damage caps that 
the North Carolina General Assembly has imposed on farm nuisance suits,62 
 
55.   See Declaration of Shane Rogers, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2017 WL 9910608 
(E.D.N.C. 2017), (No. 714CV00180); see also Deposition of Dr. Viney P. Aneja, Ph.D., 
McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2017 WL 9887574 (E.D.N.C. 2017), (No. 714CV00180); 
Expert Report of Dr. Kendall Thu, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2017 WL 9910603 
(E.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 714CV00180); Before Trial Video Deposition of Steve Wing, Ph.D., 
McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2016 WL 11418466 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (Nos. 5:15-CV-000013-
BR, 7:14-cv-00183-BR, 7:14-cv-0023-BR, 7:14-cv-00185-BR, 7:14-cv-00182-BR, 7:14-cv-
00180-BR). 
56.   Catherine Clabby, The Science of Hog Farm Odors, N.C. HEALTH NEWS (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2018/06/25/the-science-of-hog-farm-odors/. 
57.   Id. 
58.   Alex Formuzis, Ignoring Findings, State Lawmakers Look to Shield Big Pork From 
Liability, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP (May 11, 2017), https://www.ewg.org/release/study-fecal-
bacteria-nc-hog-farms-infects-nearby-homes#.WyzeAS-ZOjQ. 
59.   Id.  
60.   Homeowners Receive $50M for Hog Farm Nuisance, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 
No. 7:14CV00180 (E.D.N.C. 2018), 2018 WL 4582665.  
61.   Id. 
62.   See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-702(a) (2018) (capping compensatory damages for a 
permanent nuisance at the fair market value of the property and capping compensatory 
damages for a temporary nuisance at the diminution in the fair rental value of the property); 
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-702(a1) (2018) (removing the ability to recover punitive 
damages where the “nuisance emanated from an agricultural or forestry operation that has not 
been subject to a criminal conviction or a civil enforcement action taken by a State or federal 
environmental regulatory agency”). 
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the judge reduced the $50 million to $3.25 million.63 In June 2018, the second 
verdict in this series of lawsuits was rendered.64 The jury awarded the 
plaintiffs more than $25 million in damages.65 In August 2018, the third 
verdict in this series of lawsuits was rendered, and the jury awarded the 
plaintiffs $473.5 million in damages.66 Each plaintiff received between $3 
million and $5 million in compensatory damages, and the jury awarded $75 
million in punitive damages to each plaintiff.67 The verdict was capped and 
remitted to $94 million.68 The fourth verdict in this series came in December 
2018.69 This verdict carried no punitive damages, and the jury awarded each 
of the neighbors between $100 and $75,000.70 
D. Big Pork’s Marketing: Community Response to Nuisance Lawsuits 
Against Farmers 
The summer of 2018 aimed the spotlight on North Carolina agriculture. 
During the course of a few months, several verdicts against Murphy-Brown, 
Inc., a subsidiary of Smithfield Foods, were handed down, and North 
Carolina lawmakers responded with an amendment to the North Carolina 
Right-to-farm Act.71 The response of lawmakers was spurred not only by 
their own disagreement with the court decisions but by the strong reaction 
of their constituents.72 Following the decisions, North Carolinians began to 
 
63.   Anne Blythe, Jury Awards Hog Farm Neighbors $50 Million. A Judge Reduced the Award 
Dramatically., NEWS & OBSERVER (May 9, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/busin
ess/article210747979.html. 
64.   Homeowners Received $12.1M for Hog Farm Nuisance, McGowen v. Murphy-Brown, 
LLC, No. 7:14CV00182 (E.D.N.C. 2018), 2018 WL 4859109.  
65.   Id.  
66.   Travis Fain, Jury Awards $473.5 Million to Neighbors Who Sued Smithfield Over Hog 
Waste, WRAL (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.wral.com/third-hog-trial-to-jury-plaintiffs-ask-
for-millions/17743873/.  
67.   Id.  
68.   Id.  
69.   Andrew M. Ballardin & Steven M. Sellers, No Punitive Damages in Latest Hog Farm 
Odor Lawsuit (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 13, 2018, 9:59 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/X5MJH87G000000?bna_news_filter=true&jcsearch=BNA%252000000167a7b9d7
d0a5fff7bf93400000#jcite.  
70.   Id.  
71.   See discussion infra Part II.E.  
72.   Cole Villena, Big Pork Rallies as the General Assembly Protects Chinese-Owned 
Smithfield Foods From Nuisance Lawsuits, INDYWEEK (June 27, 2018, 10:28 AM), 
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show their support for the farmers through rallies and demonstrations, as 
well as by posting signs on their lawns.73 This reaction may be attributed to 
the pork industry’s portrayal of these lawsuits to the public.74 The rallies, 
some of which took place at a hog farm and some of which took place in the 
state capital, framed the issue as an attack on family farms.75 The signs in local 
yards read, “Stand Up for NC Farm Families” and “Stop Complaining or Put 
Down the Bacon.”76 The content of the rallies and the signs, however, 
misinterpreted the situation. These lawsuits targeted Murphy-Brown, not the 
local farmers. Additionally, politicians continually referred to the hog 
neighbor’s attorneys as “out-of-state lawyers” in an attempt to garner 
sympathy for the local farmers.77 It is this public relations strategy which 
helped spawn the 2018 amendment to North Carolina’s Right-to-farm Act.  
E. The Legislative Action in the Wake of the Murphy-Brown Litigation 
In 1979, the North Carolina legislature adopted its first right-to-farm act.78 
The stated purpose at that time was to “reduce the loss to the State of its 
agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which agricultural 
operations may be deemed to be a nuisance.”79 This limitation was said to be 
imposed in order to “conserve and protect and encourage the development 
and improvement of its agriculture land for the production of food and other 
agricultural products.”80 The current version of this stated purpose has only 
slightly changed in that it now explicitly includes forestry operations; 
however, the same general intent remains: limit the circumstances in which 
 
https://indyweek.com/news/archives/big-pork-rallies-general-assembly-protects-chinese-
owned-smithfield-foods-nuisance-lawsuits/.  
73.   Id.  
74.   See, e.g., The Hog Nuisance Trials: A Summary, N.C. FARM FAM. (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.ncfarmfamilies.com/farmkeepersblog/2018/08/29/the-hog-nuisance-trials-a-
summary. 
75.   Charlotte Harris, ‘Traffic Jam’ at Duplin County Hog Farm as Rally Pushes Back on 
Neighbors’ Lawsuits, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 10, 2018, 10:12 PM), https://www.newsobserver
.com/news/politics-government/article214649640.html; Villena, supra note 72. 
76.   Villena, supra note 72. 
77.   Id. 
78.   See Smart, supra note 14, at 2099.  
79.   Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140-41 (codified as amended 
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2020)). 
80.   Id. 
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nuisance suits may be brought in order to protect agricultural operations.81 
This overarching purpose is generally shared among many states.82  
The typical right-to-farm statute contains some provision for the “coming 
to the nuisance” defense.83 This defense provides that farms cannot be subject 
to liability for “becom[ing] a nuisance” because of a change in the 
surrounding locality.84 Providing this defense for farmers was the primary 
reason many states enacted right-to-farm statutes during the 1970s and 
1980s.85 During this period, lands which were formerly agricultural rural 
areas began experiencing increased urbanization with the rise of suburban 
homes.86 In an effort to protect farmers from potential nuisance liability, 
many states began enacting “right-to-farm” laws with provisions stating that 
farm operations shall not “be or become a nuisance . . . by any changed 
conditions in or about the locality outside of the operation.”87 In fact, prior 
to the 2018 amendment, North Carolina’s right-to-farm act mirrored that 
language.88 The 2013 version of North Carolina’s right-to-farm statute read: 
No agricultural or forestry operation or any of its 
appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance, private or 
public, by any changed conditions in or about the locality 
outside of the operation after the operation has been in 
operation for more than one year, when such operation was 
not a nuisance at the time the operation began.89 
This language reflected the main purpose for which the legislature adopted 
the right-to-farm: protecting farmers from nuisance liability as a result of 
changes in their locality.90 In fact, the 1979 North Carolina Right-to-farm Act 
 
81.   N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020). 
82.   See Smart, supra note 14, at 2099. 
83.   Id. at 2100. 
84.   Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140-41 (codified as amended 
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2020)). 
85.   See Smart, supra note 14, at 2099. 
86.   Id. at 2116. 
87.   Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858-59 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020)). 
88.   N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2018). 
89.   Id. 
90.   Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858-59 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2013)). 
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noted this as one of its purposes by observing in its declaration of policy that 
“[w]hen nonagricultural land uses extend into agricultural areas, agricultural 
operations often become the subject of nuisance suits.”91  
The provision for the “coming to the nuisance” defense through the 
“changed conditions” language did more than protect farmers from nuisance 
liability; it preserved a method of recourse for plaintiffs when a nuisance 
came to them. For example, in McKiver, the plaintiffs had lived on the 
properties for decades prior to the establishment of the farm. That fact 
provided their cases the ability to avoid being precluded by statute.92 
However, in 2018, the North Carolina General Assembly directly 
responded to the multitude of lawsuits filed against Murphy-Brown, LLC and 
amended the North Carolina Right-to-farm Act to remove any language 
regarding “changed conditions in the locality.”93 Senate Bill 711 cited the 
reason for the Bill, stating that “frivolous nuisance lawsuits” were forcing the 
State to “make plain [the legislature’s] intent that existing farms . . . in North 
Carolina that are operating in good faith be shielded from nuisance lawsuits 
filed long after the operations [were] established.”94 The General Assembly 
also specifically cited the recent suits against Murphy-Brown, LLC, stating 
that “recently a federal trial court incorrectly and narrowly interpreted the 
North Carolina Right-to-farm Act in a way that contradicts the intent of the 
General Assembly.”95 This statement suggests that it is the General 
Assembly’s intent that this Act be interpreted broadly to offer farms 
maximum protection from nuisance liability. Following the 2018 
amendment, North Carolina’s Right-to-farm Act now reads:  
No nuisance action may be filed against an agricultural or 
forestry operation unless all of the following apply:  
(1) The plaintiff is a legal possessor of the real property 
affected by the conditions alleged to be a nuisance.  
 
91.   Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140-41 (codified as amended 
at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-700 (2020)). 
92.   Third Amended Complaint at 80, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 7:14-cv-
00180-BR (E.D.N.C. 2018), 2018 WL 4189408. 
93.   Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020), with Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 
106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858-59 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 
(2013)). 
94.   S. 711, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2018).  
95.   Id.  
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(2) The real property affected by the conditions alleged to 
be a nuisance is located within one half-mile of the source of 
the activity or structure alleged to be a nuisance.  
(3) The action is filed within one year of the establishment 
of the agricultural or forestry operation or within one year 
of the operation undergoing a fundamental change.96 
This revised language only permits plaintiffs who have had a nuisance come 
to them a mere year to file a lawsuit, or otherwise lose the opportunity.  
F. The Governor Veto and Its Override 
On June 15, 2018, the North Carolina General Assembly presented the 
right-to-farm amendment to Governor Roy Cooper.97 On June 25, 2018, 
Governor Cooper returned his veto of the bill.98 In his veto message, 
Governor Cooper stated that the laws of North Carolina “must balance the 
needs of businesses versus property rights. Giving one industry special 
treatment at the expense of its neighbors is unfair.”99 The Governor also 
referenced the infamous Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) case in which he, 
as Attorney General of North Carolina, represented the state in a nuisance 
claim against TVA based on the air pollution that the company was pumping 
into the North Carolina mountains.100  
On June 26, 2018, the North Carolina State Senate met to discuss the 
Governor’s veto and the possibility of overriding his veto.101 In a 37–9 vote, 
the Senate voted to override Governor Cooper’s veto of the 2018 Farm Bill.102 
The bill then made its way to the House of Representatives.  
On June 27, 2018, the North Carolina House of Representatives met to 
discuss overriding Governor Cooper’s veto of the 2018 Farm Bill.103 In a 74–
45 vote, the House of Representatives joined the Senate in voting to override 
 
96.   N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020). 
97.   S. 711, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2018). 
98.   ROY COOPER, GOVERNOR ROY COOPER OBJECTIONS AND VETO MESSAGE, (June 25, 2018). 
99.   Id. 
100.   Id. 
101.   Senate Bill 711, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.ncleg.gov/BillLookup/2017/s711 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2020). 
102.   Id. 
103.   Id. 
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   142 5/14/20   9:43 AM
2020]            THIS LITTLE PIGGY CAUSED A NUISANCE             583 
 
 
 
the Governor’s veto.104 Following the override, the 2018 Farm Bill was 
ratified, thus amending the North Carolina Right-to-farm Act.105 
G. Problems with the Current Language of the Statute 
As mentioned above, the current language of the statute states that a 
person may bring an action in nuisance if they fit the specified criteria. One 
of the three listed criteria is that the plaintiff must file the action “within one 
year of the establishment of the agricultural or forestry operation or within 
one year of the operation undergoing a fundamental change.”106 The General 
Assembly then defined “fundamental change” in the negative, saying that it 
is not “[a] change in ownership or size,” “[a]n interruption of farming for a 
period of no more than three years,” “[p]articipation in a government-
sponsored agricultural program,” “[e]mployment of new technology,” or a 
“[c]hange in type of agricultural or forestry product produced.”107 This 
definition in the negative poses a few issues for those interpreting and 
applying the statute.  
The statute states that a fundamental change is not a “change in type of 
agricultural or forestry product produced.”108 Read plainly, this provision 
means that a farm may change from producing crops to producing hogs 
without having to worry about its neighbors holding it liable for its newly 
generated nuisance. This provision seems to overrule the Court of Appeals of 
North Carolina’s decision in Durham v. Britt.109 In Britt, the plaintiff and his 
wife built a home and later purchased the property across the road.110 At the 
time that the plaintiff purchased that property, the defendant operated three 
turkey houses on the eastern border of the property.111 The defendant had 
been operating his farm for over twenty years when the plaintiff purchased 
the adjoining property.112 A couple of years after the plaintiff had purchased 
the property, the defendant wrote the plaintiff a letter telling of his intent to 
construct and operate a hog farm on his own land and requesting access to 
 
104.   Id. 
105.   S. 711, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2018). 
106.   N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a)(3) (2020). 
107.   Id. at (a1). 
108.   Id. at (a1)(5). 
109.   Durham v. Britt, 451 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).  
110.   Id. at 1.  
111.   Id.  
112.   Id. 
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the road adjoining their properties.113 The plaintiff never responded to this 
letter.114 The plaintiff brought a nuisance action against the defendant, and 
the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant based upon the right-to-farm act.115 On appeal, the plaintiff argued 
that the Act did not apply to his case because “no nuisance existed until 
defendant Britt fundamentally changed the nature of the agricultural activity 
occurring on his property by constructing a high-volume commercial swine 
facility.”116 Based upon this argument, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the statutory immunity 
provided by the right-to-farm act did not apply in this instance.117 
While the holding in Britt makes logical sense, the language of the statute 
demonstrates that the legislature would have agreed with the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment. While the statute uses the same language, 
“fundamental change,” that was used in Britt, its use runs counter to the 
statutory reference to the case by including a provision that contradicts the 
case’s outcome. The court in Britt found that, “[c]ertainly, in the instant case, 
a fundamental change has occurred where defendant, who previously 
operated turkey houses, has decided to change his farming operation to that 
of a hog production facility.”118 Now, the statute allows for such a 
fundamental change and expressly states that a fundamental change is not “a 
change in the type of agricultural or forestry product produced.”119 Thus, 
under the current statute, a court would have to affirm the trial court’s grant 
of summary judgment, unless that court narrowly construed the term 
“product.” 
Second, the statute states that a fundamental change is not “[a]n 
interruption of farming for a period of no more than three years.”120 This 
provision carries a new weight when considered in conjunction with the 
removal of the Act’s “changed conditions in the locality” provision. The 
changed conditions in the locality provision was a remnant of the coming to 
the nuisance defense. It provided that no agricultural or forestry operation 
 
113.   Id. at 1–2.   
114.   Id. at 2.  
115.   Durham, 451 S.E.2d at 2. 
116.   Id. at 3.  
117.   Id. at 4.  
118.   Id. 
119.   N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a1) (2020). 
120.   Id. 
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“shall be or become a nuisance . . . by any changed conditions in or about the 
locality outside of the operation after the operation has been in operation for 
more than one year, when the operation was not a nuisance at the time the 
operation began.”121 This provision was removed from the latest version of 
the Act. This suggests that someone who has moved next door to the farm 
following the farm’s establishment would be able to bring a nuisance suit if 
the operation were to undergo a fundamental change.122 However, with the 
removal of one barrier to justice, another is built. With the operations being 
permitted to have an interruption of farming, meaning no farming is 
conducted, for a period of up to three years, a party may take possession of 
the land during that interruption and have no redress when the farm reboots 
operation two years later.  
The third major issue with the negative definition of “fundamental 
change” is that a “fundamental change” does not include a change in size.123 
This is especially troubling in the era of CAFOs. Under the current language 
of the statute, a smaller farm with 200 hogs could contract with Murphy-
Brown, LLC, and begin housing 1,000 hogs without constituting a 
fundamental change. Thus, if such an occurrence were to happen, the 
neighbors of the farm would be burdened with the increased smell and 
swarms of flies without having an outlet of redress for their injuries.  
III. THE PROBLEM WITH RESTRICTIVE RIGHT-TO-FARM ACTS 
The right-to-farm has arisen out of a justified need to protect America’s 
farmers from economic destruction at the hands of their neighbors. The 
societal need for the agricultural industry further supports the 
implementation of the right-to-farm. However, implementing a right-to-
farm magnifies the need to ensure the protection of property rights for farm 
neighbors. The primary purpose of nuisance law is to protect the right to use 
and enjoy one’s property. In adopting and ratifying the right-to-farm, most 
states implemented the typical “coming to the nuisance” defense that revokes 
 
121.   Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858-59 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020)). 
122.   This is because the only three requirements for standing are that the plaintiff? is the 
“legal possessor of the real property affected by the conditions alleged to be a nuisance,” that 
the affected property be “located within one half-mile of the source of the activity or structure 
alleged to be a nuisance,” and that the “action be filed within one year of the establishment of 
the . . . operation or within one year of the operation undergoing a fundamental change.” See 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020). 
123.   N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020). 
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a property owner’s nuisance claim where the owner moved next door to the 
purported nuisance (i.e., the farm). This decision resulted from a balancing 
of interests. In the eyes of the lawmakers, it seemed just to protect farmers 
from potential litigation where a neighbor “came to the nuisance.” Similarly, 
it seemed fair and equitable to disallow a nuisance claim where the party 
bringing the action is responsible for the complained injury. For these 
reasons, the “coming to the nuisance” defense has persisted and should 
persist within right-to-farm acts.  
With the birth of the right-to-farm, lobbyists began pushing the General 
Assembly for further protections from nuisance litigation. These additional 
protections came in the form of additional criteria that plaintiffs must satisfy 
for their action to survive a motion to dismiss. In North Carolina, these 
criteria include provisions requiring the action to be filed within one year of 
a new operation’s establishment or within one year of a fundamental change 
to an existing operation.124 Though the act does not define a fundamental 
change, it explains that a fundamental change is not a change in size or 
product type.125 While these provisions further the state’s interest in shielding 
agricultural operations from nuisance liability, the strictness of the criteria 
and the narrow definition, or definition by broad exclusion, of what 
constitutes a fundamental change functions contrary to the interest of 
preserving property rights. With the rise of CAFOs, strict restrictions upon 
nuisance claims create problems for property owners. These problems 
include the infringement upon property rights guaranteed by both the state 
and federal Constitutions, the health issues arising from current farming 
methods, and the disincentive to solve these issues.  
A.  Infringement upon Property Rights: Revoking the Right to Use and 
Enjoy Property 
The right to use and enjoy one’s property has been recognized since the 
days of Blackstone. Indeed, Sir William Blackstone acknowledged this right 
in the chapter “Of Nuisance” within his Commentaries on the Laws of 
England. In that chapter, Blackstone states, “if a person keeps his hogs . . . so 
near the house of another that the stench of them incommodes him and 
makes the air unwholesome, this is an injurious nuisance, as it tends to 
 
124.   Id.  
125.   Id.  
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deprive him of the use and benefit of his house.”126 This right to use and enjoy 
one’s property has long been considered one of the sticks in the bundle of 
property rights.127 This bundle of rights creates the legal understanding of 
property as a collection of rights rather than merely possession of land. Thus, 
because property is observed by the law as a collection of rights, infringement 
upon any of those rights creates an infringement upon one’s property. 
Additionally, the North Carolina Supreme Court has adopted this view by 
recognizing that “‘[p]roperty’ . . . includes ‘not only the thing possessed 
but . . . the right of the owner to the land; the right to possess, use, enjoy and 
dispose of it, and the corresponding right to exclude others from its use.’”128 
1. The Example of Iowa: From Gacke to Honomichl 
In 2004, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the state’s statutory grant of 
nuisance immunity to animal feeding operations violated the Iowa 
Constitution to the extent that it deprived the plaintiffs of “a remedy for the 
taking of their property resulting from a nuisance created by an animal 
feeding operation.”129 Though this decision is not binding on North Carolina 
courts, it is highly persuasive considering the level of prominence that 
farming has in the Iowa economy compared to that of the North Carolina 
economy.130 As stated above, Iowa is the only state in the nation that produces 
more hogs than North Carolina.131 
The Gackes lived across the road from two hog buildings, both owned and 
operated by the defendant, Pork Xtra, L.L.C. The operation was established 
in 1996 and the Gackes had lived at that location since 1974.132 The Gackes 
filed an action claiming that the operation was a nuisance, citing their injuries 
of emotional distress and the decrease in the value of their property.133 The 
farm attempted to claim immunity under Iowa’s right-to-farm statute, but 
 
126.   3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217. 
127.   Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 252–53 
(2007).  
128.   Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 786 S.E.2d 919, 924 (N.C. 2016) (quoting Hildebrand 
v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 14 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1941)). 
129.   Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 2004).  
130.   Liggett, supra note 3, at 28. 
131.   See discussion supra Part II; see also Liggett, supra note 3, at 28.  
132.   Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 171. 
133.   Id.  
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   147 5/14/20   9:43 AM
588 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2 
 
the court denied its claim because it viewed the immunity as an 
unconstitutional taking.134 
In support of its holding, the court cited one of its previous decisions, 
Bormann v. Board of Supervisors in and for Kossuth County. In Bormann, the 
Kossuth County Board of Supervisors had approved the application of 
landowners to declare an agricultural area within the county.135 Their 
approval gave the applicants statutory nuisance immunity.136 The neighbors 
of the applicants challenged this declaration, and the Supreme Court of Iowa 
held that the statute’s grant of nuisance immunity created “an easement in 
the property affected by the nuisance . . . in favor of the applicants’ 
land . . . because the immunity allows the applicants to do acts on their own 
land which, were it not for the easement, would constitute a nuisance.”137 In 
Bormann, the court concluded that “such ‘[e]asements are property interests 
subject to the just compensation requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment . . . and [the Iowa] Constitution.’”138 The Gacke court found 
Bormann controlling and affirmed the lower court’s application of Bormann 
in holding Iowa’s right-to-farm statute created an unconstitutional taking.139 
The defendant in Gacke argued that the court should overrule Bormann 
because it applied a per se takings analysis rather than the Penn Central 
balancing test140 for regulatory takings. The Gacke court, however, declined 
to retreat from its holding in Bormann, stating that the “ultimate conclusion 
was simply that the immunity statute created an easement and the 
appropriation of this property right was a taking.”141 The court was not 
interested in parsing words to determine whether the taking was regulatory 
or per se; it simply found that a taking had occurred because an easement was 
created.142 
 
134.   Id. at 172–73. 
135.   Id. at 172.  
136.   Id.  
137.   Id. (quoting Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1998)) 
(omissions in original). 
138.   Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316) (alterations and 
omissions in original). 
139.   Id. at 173, 185. 
140.   See generally BRIAN W. BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS: AVOIDING 
INVITATIONS TO ABUSE DISCRETION § 1:21 (database updated Aug. 2019).  
141.   Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 173.  
142.   Id. at 173–74. 
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After finding that a taking had occurred, the Iowa court turned to the issue 
of whether the taking was a valid exercise of the state’s police power; it held 
that it was not. The court found that the statutory nuisance immunity 
constituted an “oppressive exercise of the state’s police power.”143 The court 
noted that it is “important in substantive due process analysis to consider 
whether the effect of a statute is ‘to give an injured person, in essence, no right 
of recovery.’”144 The court noted that the Gackes bore the burden of the 
statute’s “undesirable impact” without a “corresponding benefit” and the 
statute deprived them of any remedy for their injury.145 The court 
summarized the situation by stating that “one property owner—the 
producer—is given the right to use his property without due regard for the 
personal and property rights of his neighbor.”146 The court held that such a 
situation resulted in an unduly oppressive exercise of the state’s police 
power.147 
In 2018, the Supreme Court of Iowa discussed the application of the Gacke 
factors.148 In this decision, the court identified the procedural options 
available to Iowa courts as they balance the Gacke factors with the legislative 
purpose of the right-to-farm.149 This procedure would unfold as follows: the 
CAFOs would be allowed to plead the right-to-farm as an affirmative defense, 
then the plaintiffs would be required to show that the statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to them through proving the Gacke factors.150  
 In Honomichl, the defendants were Valley View Swine, LLC, and JBS Live 
Pork, LLC.151 The defendants partnered together to establish CAFOs at two 
locations in Wapello County, Iowa.152 The plaintiffs were owners of real estate 
located near the defendants’ CAFOs and alleged that the CAFOs constituted 
a nuisance because of “the odors, pathogens, and flies” that emanated from 
 
143.   Id. at 185.  
144.   Id. at 179 (quoting Shearer v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 236 N.W.2d 688, 692 (Iowa 
1975)).  
145.   Id. 
146.   Id. 
147.   Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 179.  
148.   Honomichl v. Valley View Swine, LLC, 914 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 2018).  
149.   Id. at 238.  
150.   Id.  
151.   Id. at 227.  
152.   Id. 
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the farms.153 The district court then split the case into three divisions based 
upon the allegations against the different defendants.154 The Division A 
plaintiffs filed an amended petition claiming “temporary nuisance, 
permanent nuisance, and negligence.”155 The defendants answered the 
complaint alleging Iowa’s right-to-farm statute as an affirmative defense.156 
Following the initial pleadings, the court allowed the plaintiffs and 
defendants to choose two plaintiff households for separate bellwether trials 
to occur in the different divisions.157 
In all the divisions, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment 
alleging that the right-to-farm provided them with statutory immunity to the 
plaintiffs’ claims.158 On the same day that the defendants filed their motions 
for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment, requesting that the court declare the statutory immunity defense 
unconstitutional as applied to their case.159 The district court granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all permanent nuisance 
claims but granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment in 
Division A.160 Thus, the court declared that the statute was unconstitutional 
as applied to the Division A plaintiffs.161 The defendants appealed, arguing 
that the district court erred in granting the plaintiffs’ motion and finding that 
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the Division A plaintiffs.162 
Specifically, the defendants alleged that the district court improperly applied 
the Gacke holding without making specific factual findings.163 The Supreme 
Court of Iowa agreed with the defendants, and reversed and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.164 The court concluded that “[w]ithout this fact-
based analysis, we are unable to resolve this issue on this record.”165 
 
153.   Id. at 226. 
154.   Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 228. 
155.   Id.  
156.   Id. at 228–29. 
157.   Id. at 229.  
158.   Id. 
159.   Id. 
160.   Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 229. 
161.   Id. 
162.   Id. at 230. 
163.   Id. 
164.   Id. at 238.  
165.   Id. at 227.  
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The Supreme Court of Iowa began its analysis of the situation by 
distinguishing between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges.166 It 
noted that facial challenges are those in which “no application of the statute 
could be constitutional under any set of facts.”167 However, “an as-applied 
challenge alleges the statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular set 
of facts.”168 In Gacke, the court found Iowa’s Right-to-farm statute 
unconstitutional as applied.169 After noting the distinction between facial and 
as-applied constitutional challenges, the court reviewed its analysis in 
Gacke.170 
The court began its review of Gacke by discussing Iowa’s inalienable rights 
clause, stating, “This provision protects ‘pre-existing common law’ property 
rights from ‘arbitrary restrictions.’”171 This protection is subject to 
“reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power.”172 The 
court’s analysis then began to mirror the North Carolina takings analysis 
presented below. The court’s analytical framework, like the North Carolina 
takings analysis, is split into two steps.173 First, it must appear that the public 
interest requires state interference with the individual’s right.174 Second, the 
means of accomplishing the purpose must be “reasonably necessary” and not 
“unduly oppressive upon individuals.”175 The similarities between North 
Carolina’s takings analysis and Iowa’s inalienable rights clause framework 
end in applying this second step of analysis.176 That is because in applying the 
second step of the analysis, Iowa courts must apply Gacke’s three-prong 
test.177 This test states:  
 
166.   Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 231.  
167.   Id.  
168.   Id. 
169.   Id. at 234.  
170.   Id. at 235–37.  
171.   Id. at 235 (citing May’s Drug Stores v. State Tax Comm’n, 45 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa 
1950)).  
172.   Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 235 (quoting Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 
176 (Iowa 2004)). 
173.   Id. (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136–37 (1984)). 
174.   Id. (citing Lawton, 152 U.S. at 136–37). 
175.   Id. (quoting Lawton, 152 U.S. at 136–37). 
176.   Id. 
177.   Id. 
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[P]laintiffs must show they (1) receive[d] no particular 
benefit from the nuisance immunity granted to their 
neighbors other than that inuring to the public in general[,] 
(2) sustain[ed] significant hardship[,] and (3) resided on 
their property long before any animal operation was 
commenced on neighboring land and had spent 
considerable sums of money in improvements to their 
property prior to construction of the defendant’s facilities.178 
The court in Honomichl noted that in Gacke, it found the statute 
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs because of the way their specific 
circumstances affected the application of this test.179  
 After reviewing its decision in Gacke, the court considered the changes 
that the industry had undergone and the significant regulatory schemes that 
had been enacted since Gacke was decided.180 Despite these changes, the court 
reaffirmed the Gacke test as the standard for analyzing as-applied 
constitutional challenges to the Iowa Right-to-farm Act.181  
The court in Honomichl explained that the Gacke factors could not be 
decided at the summary judgment stage because each of the factors is 
“dependent upon the genuine issues of material fact of each case.”182 It 
stressed this finding by referring to the Gacke test as the “fact-specific 
enterprise of balancing of interests.”183 Although it would not permit the as-
applied constitutional challenge to be resolved at the summary judgment 
stage, the court specifically noted that the challenge could be resolved in 
pretrial litigation.184 However, the proper application of the test is to: 
[A]llow the CAFOs to plead [the right-to-farm] as an 
affirmative defense to the claims, if applicable. 
Correspondingly, the plaintiffs claiming [the right-to-farm] 
is unconstitutional as applied to them must prove the factors 
 
178.   Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gacke v. 
Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 178 (Iowa 2004)) (alterations in original). 
179.   Id. at 235–36.  
180.   Id. at 236–37. 
181.   Id. at 237. 
182.   Id.  
183.   Id. at 238 (quoting Dalarna Farms v. Access Energy Coop., 792 N.W.2d 656 (Iowa 
2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
184.   Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 238. 
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set forth in Gacke. After the parties have submitted their 
proof, the court can then determine the constitutionality of 
[the right-to-farm] as applied to particular plaintiffs.185  
The court could make this determination in a pretrial hearing which would 
allow the court to “properly balance the Gacke factors with the legislative 
purpose of the statute to protect and promote animal agriculture in the 
state.”186 The court in Honomichl concluded that the district court erred by 
declaring the statute unconstitutional as applied to Division A plaintiffs 
“without the benefit of specific fact-finding.”187 
Gacke provides an example of how a court might resolve the injustice 
created by application of the right-to-farm’s statutory nuisance immunity; it 
provides excellent reasoning for finding that a right-to-farm statute can 
constitute a taking and that provisions for nuisance immunity tend to create 
easements.  
2. The North Carolina Takings Clause Analysis  
In North Carolina, the “fundamental right to property is as old as [the] 
state.”188 Although the state constitution does not contain an express takings 
provision, “the fundamental right to just compensation [i]s so grounded in 
natural law and justice that it is considered an integral part of the law of the 
land within the meaning of Article I, Section 19 of our [North Carolina] 
Constitution.”189 North Carolina, through its takings jurisprudence, has 
defined a taking as “the taking of something, whether it is the actual physical 
property or merely the right of ownership, use or enjoyment.”190 Here, there 
is an obvious impact upon property rights. The use and enjoyment of 
property is an interest in property, the taking of which is compensable under 
 
185.   Id. 
186.   Id. 
187.   Id. 
188.   Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 786 S.E.2d 919, 923 (N.C. 2016) (citing eighteenth 
century legal and political documents).  
189.   Id. at 924 (quoting Long v. City of Charlotte, 293 S.E.2d 101, 107–08 (N.C. 1982)) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
190.   Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 769 S.E.2d 218, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting S. 
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hous. Auth., 247 S.E.2d 663, 666 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978)).  
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the state takings doctrine.191 However, the takings inquiry does not end at 
determining impact upon property rights.  
After determining an impact, if any, upon property rights, the court will 
then ask whether the state’s act is an exercise of its police powers or of 
eminent domain.192 The government uses its police power to regulate 
property to “prevent injury to the public.”193 Such regulations “must be 
enacted in good faith, and ha[ve] appropriate and direct connection with that 
protection to life, health, and property which each State owes to her 
citizens.”194 In contrast, the government uses its power of eminent domain to 
take property “for public use because such action is advantageous or 
beneficial to the public.”195 A taking may last for a limited period or 
indefinitely. As such, a taking may take the form of “an easement, a mere 
limited use, . . . [or] an absolute, unqualified fee.”196 “The state must 
compensate for property rights taken by eminent domain; damages resulting 
from the exercise of the police power are noncompensable.”197 The North 
Carolina Court of Appeals has drawn the distinction between the exercise of 
police powers and eminent domain in relation to the use and enjoyment of 
property. In Kirby, the court stated that “[i]n the exercise of eminent 
domain[,] property or an easement therein is taken from the owner and 
applied to public use because the use or enjoyment of such property or 
easement therein is beneficial to the public.”198 In contrast, “[i]n the exercise 
 
191.   See Long, 293 S.E.2d at 109 (stating that for a taking to occur, “there need only be a 
substantial interference with elemental rights growing out of the ownership of the property”); 
see also Ivester v. City of Winston-Salem, 1 S.E.2d 88, 88, 90 (1939) (holding odors, smoke, 
ashes, rats, and mosquitoes and other insects from a sewage disposal plant to be a taking); Gray 
v. City of High Point, 166 S.E. 911, 913 (N.C. 1932) (holding odors from an adjacent sewage 
disposal plant to be a taking); Hines v. City of Rocky Mount, 78 S.E. 510, 511 (N.C. 1913) 
(holding odors from a nearby trash dump to be a taking). 
192.   Kirby, 786 S.E.2d at 924. 
193.   Id.  
194.   Id. (quoting City of Durham v. Eno Cotton Mills, 54 S.E. 453, 462 (N.C. 1906)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
195.   Id.  
196.   Id. at 295 (quoting Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 112 S.E.2d 111, 
113 (N.C. 1960)) (alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197.   Barnes v. N.C. State Highway Comm’n, 126 S.E.2d 732, 738 (N.C. 1962) (quoting State 
v. Fox, 332 P.2d 943, 946 (Wash. 1958)).  
198.   Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 769 S.E.2d 218, 230 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting 
Durham, 54 S.E. at 462) (second alteration in original). 
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of the police power[,] the owner is denied the unrestricted use or enjoyment 
of his property, or his property is taken from him because his use or 
enjoyment of such property is injurious to the public welfare.”199 
The North Carolina Right-to-farm Act constitutes an unconstitutional 
taking without just compensation as applied to neighbors of CAFOs. First, 
there is an impact upon the neighbors’ property rights. As stated above, 
property rights include the right to use and enjoy one’s property. Such 
interest is taken from neighbors of CAFOs through the offensive odors and 
influx of flies. Some individuals have described the horrible smell that settles 
in their hair and clothes, following them all day.200 Others tell of how they 
cannot go outside because the odor induces nausea and makes them sick.201 
In addition to these reactions to the odor, a researcher at Duke University 
has found that people living near hog CAFOs “showed ‘more tension, 
depression, more anger, less vigor, more fatigue and more confusion’ than 
others.”202 These testimonials indicate the negative impact that CAFOs have 
on their neighbors’ use and enjoyment of their property, and establishes a 
basis for damages.  
The next step of the North Carolina takings analysis is to analyze whether 
the Right-to-farm Act is an exercise of the state’s police powers or of eminent 
domain. As stated above, an exercise of a police power must have an 
“appropriate and direct connection” to the protection of life, health, or 
property, which the state owes to its citizens. The right-to-farm is not such a 
protection. Viewing the act in the light most favorable to the government, the 
Right-to-farm Act protects the North Carolina economy. However, 
protection of the economy is not an enumerated interest and thus constitutes 
“[a]n exercise of police power outside of these bounds[, which] may result in 
a taking.”203  
After determining that the right-to-farm does not constitute an exercise of 
the police power, the analysis then asks whether it is an exercise of eminent 
domain. Here, the right-to-farm is an exercise of eminent domain as applied 
to CAFO neighbors because the nuisance immunity provision is a 
governmental action which “takes property for public use because such 
 
199.   Id. (quoting Durham, 54 S.E. at 462) (second alteration in original). 
200.   DAVID KIRBY, ANIMAL FACTORY: THE LOOMING THREAT OF INDUSTRIAL PIG, DAIRY, 
AND POULTRY FARMS TO HUMANS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 89 (2010).  
201.   Id.  
202.   Id. at 90.  
203.   Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 786 S.E.2d 919, 924 (N.C. 2016). 
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action is advantageous or beneficial to the public.”204 The analogy to Gacke 
applies here. Like the plaintiffs in Gacke, the neighbors of North Carolina 
CAFOs also have had an easement created on their land through the statutory 
immunity granted to CAFOs by the state. Like the statute in Gacke, the North 
Carolina statute creates an easement because “the immunity allows the 
[CAFOs] to do acts on their own land which, were it not for the easement, 
would constitute a nuisance.”205 Thus, relying on the reasoning in Gacke, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court should find that the North Carolina right-to-
farm act constitutes an unconstitutional taking as applied to neighbors of 
CAFOs.  
3. Due Process Jurisprudence  
In addition to providing excellent reasoning for a takings analysis, Gacke 
also hints that narrow provisions within right-to-farm acts may violate due 
process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (the Due Process Clause) provides that “[n]o State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”206 The North Carolina constitution 
provides a parallel provision in Article I Section 19, which states that “[n]o 
person shall be . . . in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but 
by the law of the land.”207 The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that 
“[t]he term ‘law of the land’ as used in Article I, Section 19, of the 
Constitution of North Carolina, is synonymous with ‘due process of law’ as 
used in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”208 Due 
Process jurisprudence divides due process into two categories: substantive 
due process and procedural due process.209 Substantive due process asks 
whether there is a sufficient justification or purpose for the government’s 
deprivation of a person’s life, liberty, or property.210 Procedural due process 
 
204.   Id.  
205.   Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Iowa 2004).  
206.   U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
207.   N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.  
208.   State v. Williams, 761 S.E.2d 662, 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (alteration in original). 
209.   State v. Thompson, 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (N.C. 1998). 
210.   Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999).  
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asks whether the government followed proper procedures when taking life, 
liberty, or property.211 Here, substantive due process applies.  
“‘Substantive due process’ protection prevents the government from 
engaging in conduct that . . . interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’”212 It is a “guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding 
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the 
law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained.”213 
Essentially, substantive due process “protects the public from government 
action that unreasonably deprives them of a liberty or property interest.”214  
The first step in analyzing a substantive due process claim is to determine 
the interest or right being invaded. The party seeking procedural protection 
bears the burden of establishing that a life, liberty, or property interest is at 
stake.215 If the right infringed upon is fundamental, then the court will apply 
strict scrutiny, and the state must demonstrate “a compelling state interest 
for the law to survive a constitutional attack.”216 If the interest is not 
fundamental, then the court will apply the rational basis test, and “the 
government action need only have a rational relation to a legitimate 
governmental objective to pass constitutional muster.”217 To determine 
whether a right is fundamental, the court must assess “whether it is 
‘objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition or if it is 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice 
would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’”218 A violation of substantive due process 
may be claimed “any time the government takes away life, liberty or 
property.”219 This is because “[a]ny time the government deprives a person of 
 
211.   Id. 
212.   Thompson, 508 S.E.2d at 282 (citations omitted).  
213.   State v. Joyner, 211 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 1975).  
214.   Tripp v. City of Winston-Salem, 655 S.E.2d 890, 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting 
Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)). 
215.   Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). 
216.   Clark v. Sanger Clinic, 542 S.E.2d 668, 673 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
217.   Tripp, 655 S.E.2d at 893 (quoting Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2002)). 
218.   Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 730 (N.C. 2008) (quoting Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).  
219.   Chemerinsky, supra note 210, at 1508.  
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life, liberty or property, the government must provide a sufficient 
justification.”220  
A substantive due process issue arises in the context of the amended Act 
and its provision of nuisance immunity. The right or interest being invaded 
by the provision of statutory nuisance immunity for farmers is the right to 
use and enjoy one’s property. The right to use and enjoy one’s property is a 
fundamental property interest that is deeply rooted in the history and 
tradition of the United States. This property interest has existed since the 
time of Sir William Blackstone and is documented in his Commentaries on 
the Laws of England.221 Additionally, the existence of nuisance as a cause of 
action, specifically designed to protect the use and enjoyment of one’s 
property, evidences the fundamental nature of the right in both the United 
States and the State of North Carolina. Indeed, as demonstrated above, the 
“fundamental right to property is as old as [the] state” and the term property 
in North Carolina includes the use and enjoyment thereof.222 
Because the right to use and enjoy one’s property is a fundamental right, 
the court must apply strict scrutiny in determining whether the deprivation 
of it is adequately justified. Strict scrutiny requires the government to prove 
that the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental 
interest.223 In this context, the interest that the state will likely claim will be 
the economic benefit of shielding farms from nuisance liability, as well as the 
purpose espoused in the Act. While this is a legitimate governmental interest, 
the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve this end. As stated herein, there 
are several issues with the language of the statute that could work an injustice 
to the people of North Carolina.224 Because the statute is not narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling governmental interest, it will fail strict scrutiny.  
It would be presumptuous to claim definitively how a court will decide this 
argument. However, based on the sea of cases flowing out of the eastern 
district of North Carolina, it is likely that the court will decide for the farm 
neighbors. Regardless, a substantive due process claim would be a viable 
alternative cause of action where a farm neighbor seeks to bring a nuisance 
 
220.   Id. at 1509.  
221.   1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (“The third absolute right, inherent in 
every Englishman, is that of property; which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal 
of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”). 
222.   Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 786 S.E.2d 919, 923 (N.C. 2016). 
223.   CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (5th ed. 2016).  
224.   See discussion supra Part II.F.  
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claim against a farm or agricultural producer because the statutory nuisance 
immunity creates an easement on the neighbor’s property. 
B. Mitigating the Harm  
If the courts fail to find the Right-to-farm Act unconstitutional based upon 
the arguments herein, the North Carolina courts can still mitigate the 
damages that the newly amended right-to-farm act will pose to its citizenry 
by utilizing an undue burden standard for substantive due process and 
finding the statute unconstitutional as applied to certain plaintiffs. By 
following the example of Iowa, North Carolina courts can introduce pretrial 
hearings to determine whether the statute should be applied in specific 
situations. The purpose of these hearings will be to balance the interests of 
the parties. Ideally, this balancing will take a form like the Gacke model,225 or 
it could take the form of Restatement (2d) of Torts § 826.226 Either form 
would allow the CAFOs to plead the right-to-farm as an affirmative defense, 
then allow plaintiffs to counter that argument by showing that the application 
of the statutory immunity would be unconstitutional as applied to the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff can do this by showing the court the satisfaction of the 
Gacke factors. The Gacke factors would serve best to balance the plaintiff’s 
property interests and the state’s proposed interest in offering the statutory 
immunity. This test would ensure that the statute applies to accomplish the 
purpose of the General Assembly when the statutory immunity would not 
unreasonably interfere with the rights of the farm neighbors.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 2018 amendment to the North Carolina Right-to-farm Act drastically 
limits the ability to bring a nuisance action against a farm. Its harsh 
requirements make it nearly impossible to find a set of circumstances 
whereby a potential plaintiff would be able to satisfy all of the listed criteria 
and thus be able to bring a nuisance action.227 The espoused purpose for such 
stringency is the protection and preservation of North Carolina farmers and 
North Carolina’s agricultural resources.228 What the Act fails to consider is 
that not all of North Carolina’s farms are small, family-owned operations. An 
 
225.   See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
226.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (weighing the gravity of 
the harm versus the utility of the conduct). 
227.   Id.  
228.   N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2020).  
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increasing portion of the farms in North Carolina, and across the United 
States, are shifting to the CAFO model and those operations that were once 
family-owned now either have contracts with, or are owned by, large, 
international corporations.229 With such change in the industry, North 
Carolina lawmakers must adopt a change in policy; otherwise, farm 
neighbors will be left to suffer deprivations of their property rights and 
injuries to their health without compensation. Without reform, the cost of 
maintaining a nuisance will be placed upon the farm neighbor, rather than 
borne by the business itself or the consumer who “rightfully should pay for 
the entire cost of producing the product he desires to obtain.”230  
For the above reasons, the courts should either hold the statute facially 
unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to certain plaintiffs. 
Additionally, the North Carolina General Assembly should further amend 
the statute to preclude CAFOs from receiving the benefits of nuisance 
immunity. Finally, plaintiffs must work with their attorneys to seek 
alternative sources of recovery for these injuries should the courts and the 
legislature deny them with recourse for their injuries.  
 
229.   See Smart, supra note 14, at 2116. 
230.   Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 701 P.2d 222, 229 (Idaho 1985) (Bistline, J., 
dissenting).  
 
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   160 5/14/20   9:43 AM
